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THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: A LOOK AT 
INTERNATIONAL LAW USES FOR OTHER STATES
W. N. Chinamora
LLD candidate University of Stellenbosch
INTRODUCTION
In order to have a clear appreciation of the uses for other States in an exclusive economic 
zone ("the EEZ"), there is need for clarity on what "other states" contemplates.
From the onset, it must be stated that Article 58(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention ("the 
LOSC"), provides as follows :
. . .  all states, whether coastal or landlocked enjoy . . . the freedoms referred to in 
Article 871 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms.
The epithet "exclusive" may therefore, strictly speaking be a misnomer, since it creates the 
impression that other States except the coastal States do not have any rights and duties in 
that zone.2 This view is fortified by the provisions of Article 125(1) of LOSC which is in the 
following terms :
Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose 
of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the 
freedom of the seas and the common heritage of mankind.
Hence, it should be appreciated that the EEZ is a sui generis functional zone with neither a 
residual high seas character nor a territorial seas character, to obviate a presumption arising 
that, "any activity not falling within the clearly defined rights of non-coastal States would 
come under the jurisdiction of the coastal State".3 However, these freedoms may not be 
exercised arbitrarily, as there must be "due regard for the interests of other States".4
These uses will now be dealt with seriatim, and it is proposed to discuss any possible 
problems associated with each particular use.
NAVIGATION
The freedom of navigation entails that "every State, whether coastal or landlocked has the 
right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas".5 Nevertheless, the coastal State retains
1 In addition to the freedoms enumerated in Article 58(1), Article 87(1) mentions the freedom to construct 
artificial islands and other installations, freedom of fishing and of scientific research. Hence, there 
are in fact uses which other States enjoy, albeit under certain conditions. See also note 2 infra, and 
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention.
2 D. P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol 1, Oxford (1982) at p. 563 says, 'The economic 
uses of the EEZ with respect to the non-living resources thereof are exclusive to the coastal State, but 
this is not so with respect to the living resources. In this respect the EEZ is a preferential fishery zone." 
(emphasis added).
3 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea. Manchester (1983) at p.123.
4 Art.87(2). Article 58(3) is particularly important as it lays a duty on States exercising their rights in 
the EEZ to "have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and [to] comply with the 
laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State.. .  and other rules of international law."
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powers of pollution control.6 It is relevant to note that in terms of Article 88 of LOSC the 
high seas shall be used for "peaceful purposes" and, as such, any aggression-orientated 
navigation may not be undertaken in the EEZ.
It is therefore, arguable that naval manoeuvres and weapons testing, which are prima facie 
uses related to navigation, may not be peaceful uses, and a coastal State would be within 
its rights to protest against these activities taking place in its EEZ.7 In any event, it is likely 
that such actions could be viewed as breaches of Article 192 of LOSC whose aim is to 
"protect and preserve the marine environment", since they are likely to result in ecological 
harm.
While a duty exists on a coastal State to avoid anything which might amount to an 
"unjustifiable interference with navigation",8 and more particularly, refraining from 
constructing artificial islands or other installations where they may interfere with "the use 
of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation",9 in practice such structures 
may inhibit the freedom of navigation.
Theoretically, all States including land-locked States enjoy freedom of navigation in the 
EEZ, but in practice, as one commentator noted,
. . . [t]he access of landlocked States to and from the sea —  on which the effective 
exercise of these rights and freedoms thus hinges —  in turn depends on whether the 
States concerned enjoy freedom of transit through the countries by whose territories 
they are separated from the sea and on whether their vessels may freely use the 
appropriate maritime transit ports.10
It should be noted that Article 125(1) also provides th at:
. . .  landlocked States shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of the transit 
States by all means of transport (emphasis added).
Thus, it may be argued that transit rights inherently flow from the existence of the freedom 
of navigation. However, an equally convincing contention could be made that a sovereign 
State could deny transit rights if it has good reason to do so, for instance, if granting such 
rights would expose it to a threat.11 The inevitable conclusion is that landlocked States
6 Arts.210(5), 216, 211(5) and (6), 220, 234, 208, 214.
7 Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Oxford (1987) at p.68 remarks that "Article 
88 could be constructed to give preference to peaceful activities over military ones in case of competing 
uses." This view is preferable. General guidance may be obtained from article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, which requires States "to refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter".
8 Art.78(2).
9 Art.60(7).
10 L.C. Calflisch : "Landlocked States and their Access to and from the Sea." (1978)49 BYIL 71 at p.72. 
See also Uys Van Zyl, "Access to the Sea for Land-locked States" (1988). Sea Changes p.128. The 
author discusses various methods which may bo employed to guarantee transit for land-locked States, 
including granting an international servitude, which is "a real right whereby the territory of another 
State can be 'used' on a permanent basis for a particular purpose. Such servitude might include the 
actual grant of a corridor linking the territory of the land-locked State with the sea." Note, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique might expand the scope of the Beira Corridor concept a long the lines suggested by 
the author.
11 An immediate example is the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, until recently, when 
Zimbabwe was housing ANC and PAC cadres engaged in sabotage activities to destabilise the South 
African government. At that stage, it may be argued that South Africa would have had good political 
ground for denying Zimbabwe transit rights and port facilities if Zimbabwe had wanted to exercise 
freedom of navigation via South Africa.
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would have to depend on their coastal neighbours granting them generous transit and 
port privileges,12 more so, considering that the Right o f Passage Case13 did not settle that 
particular problem.
Moreover, such transit rights have to be exercised in terms of mutual agreement if conflict 
is to be avoided.14
Therefore, as a matter of international maritime law, neither the High Seas Convention nor 
LOSC provide for an unqualified limitation on the territorial sovereignty of the transit 
State allowing access to the freedom of the seas.
As such, the right could very well be of academic significance vis-a-vis the land-locked 
States.15
OVERFLIGHT
The right of flight, as with navigation, is enjoyed subject to the rights of other States. 
Consequently, a coastal State's right to construct artificial islands and installations might 
make it imperative to avoid low flying which could interfere with these structures. Similarly, 
a coastal State has the right to make laws regulating the dumping of waste in the EEZ,16 or 
preventing and controlling pollution of the marine environment through the atmosphere.17
It should be emphasised that aircraft overflying an EEZ are also required to comply with 
the Rules of Air laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation in terms of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 which are concerned with air navigation 
above the high seas. As previously noted in respect of the freedom of navigation, airborne 
m ilitary exercises above the EEZ may be incompatible with the use for "peaceful 
purposes",18 and in fact may contravene the provisions dealing with the prevention of 
pollution which may endanger the marine environment.
12 Calflish supra at p.79. See also, D. J. Divine, "Southern Africa and the Law of the Sea: Problems 
Common, Uncommon and Unique" Acta Juridica (1986) p.30.
13 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal-vs-India). Judgement of 12 April 1960, 
ICJ Reports, 46.
14 In this regard, note that Art.3 of the High Seas Convention provides as follows: "In order to enjoy 
freedom of the High Seas on equal terms with coastal States, States having no seacoast should have 
free access to the sea. To this end States situated between the sea and a State having no seacoast shall 
by common agreement with the latter. . .  accord (that Sta tel on the basis of reciprocity, free transit through 
their territory . . .  and {to that State's ships] access to seaports and the use of such ports" (emphasis 
added)
See also, Art.125 of LOSC which provides that "the terms and modalities for exercising freedom of 
transit shall be agreed between the landlocked States and transit States concerned through bilateral, subregional 
or regional agreement" and the transit States reserve the right to "take all the necessary measures to ensure 
that the rights and facilities provided fo r. . .  landlocked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate 
interests" (emphasis added).
15 Calflish supra at p.83 rightly notes that the removal of transit obstacles for landlocked States "is a 




18 In terms of Article 298(l)(b) disputes concerning naval and aerial military activities are exempted 
from compulsory settlement. The shortcomings of this, is that an opportunity may not arise for an 
authoritative arbitral tribunal to make a definitive statement on what constitutes "peaceful purposes".
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However, it should be noted that in terms of Article 78 (l)the coastal State's continental 
shelf rights do not affect the legal status of the airspace above it,1* and consequently, this 
provision has the effect of enhancing the freedom of overflight.
LAYING OF SUBMARINE CABLES AND PIPELINES
In addition to the need to pay "due regard to the interests of other States",19 20 213this right must 
be exercised subject to the provisions of Articles 88 to 115. More particularly, attention has 
to be paid to Articles 112 to 115, which make the wilful breakage of submarine cables 
punishable offences, and also impose a duty to repair pipelines or cables damaged in the 
course of laying new pipelines or cables.
A further duty is imposed to compensate ship owners who have "sacrificed an anchor, a 
net or other fishing gear in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipeline".
Be that as it may, Article 79(2) provides that subject to a State's "right to take reasonable 
measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the exploration of its natural resources 
and prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not 
impede the laying or maintenance o f such cables or pipelines" (emphasis supplied). Where consent 
is refused to the course of a pipeline, it is submitted that an aggrieved State could rely on 
this provision to lay the pipeline where they see fit.
The conclusion is nonetheless inescapable that "the rights of the other States to navigate, 
overfly and lay cables and pipelines in a coastal States's EEZ are less extensive than their 
corresponding rights on high seas".21 However, it is encouraging that State practice shows 
that agreements have in fact helped to resolve potential conflicts and are therefore a more 
desirable way of regulating interstate relationships on laying submarine cables and 
pipelines.22
FISHING
The exercise of this right is somewhat subtle and will in practice be difficult to accomplish. 
One therefore has to carefully look at Article 62(2) which is in the following terms:
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest 
the entire catch, it shall, through agreem ents. . .  give other States access to the surplus 
of the allowable catch.
The problem this provision presents is that, what constitutes allowable catch is exclusive 
to the coastal State, and so is the determination of its capaci ty to harvest the living resources 
of the EEZ. Some academic opinion23 has argued that these arc not subjective matters in
19 The EEZ concept has a significant relationship to the continental shelf concept, because in terms of 
Article 56(3) the EEZ includes the continental shelf interest in the seabed of the 200 mile zone.
20 Art.79(3) provides that "the delineation of the course for the laying o f . . .  pipelines" and not cables is 
"subject to the consent of the coastal State". It also empowers a coastal state to lay down conditions 
for cables and pipelines entering its territorial sea, and to establish its jurisdiction over cables and 
pipelines used in the exploration of its continental shelf or operations of artificial islands and 
installations under its jurisdiction.
21 Churchill and Lowe supra at pp. 135-6.
22 For example, Agreement between Norway and the United Kingdom on Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir 
and the Transmission of gas therefrom to the United Kingdom.
23 O'Connell op cit at p. 563.
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view of the obligation placed on the coastal State "to promote the objective of optimum 
utilisation "and" to allocate the surplus among other States".
However, the more compelling view contends that it is possible for the coastal State to set 
the allowable catch at any level it wished and, perhaps set a low threshold, thus eliminating 
the necessity of allowing other States access to the resources of the zone.24
It therefore, becomes clear that, while other States have a right to participate in the EEZ's 
surplus fish stocks, the right of the coastal State, in practice, may still be exclusive. This is 
all the more so when one looks at Article 62(3) which provides that, in giving access to 
other States "the coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors including . . .  the 
significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned 
and its other national interests25. .. and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States 
whose nationals have traditionally fished in the zone"26.
It seems probable that the coastal State will use its rights to determine a surplus to claim a 
monopoly rather than to allow access to other States.27 At any rate, this view is bolstered 
by the provisions of Article 62(2) which makes the obligation to give surplus to other States 
subject to "agreement or other arrangements".
It is stressed that the stance adopted does not mean that one has been oblivious to the 
provisions of Article 64(1) which provide, inter alia, that "coastal States and other States 
whose nationals fish . . .  highly migratory species. . .  shall co-operate directly or through 
appropriate international organisations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting 
the objective of optimum utilisation of such species throughout the region."
Nevertheless, this Article only comes into play once access has been given by the coastal 
State to other States. Even though there is good sense in the argument that coastal States 
cannot be allowed to claim that there is no surplus when it is manifestly clear that they 
lack capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,28 the present machinery for dispute 
resolution provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention is decidedly tilted in favour of 
the coastal State.
24 Greig, International Law, 2nd Edn. Butterworth (1976) p.310. On the contrary, the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
case, ICJ Reports 1974 at p.27 stated:
"The preferential rights of the coastal State come into play only at the moment when an intensification 
in the exploitation of the resources makes it imperative to introduce some system of catch-limitation 
and sharing of the resources to preserve the fish stocks in the interests of their rational and economic 
exploitation".
25 No wonder why Phillips "The Exclusive Economic Zone as a Concept of International Law" (1977) 26 
ICLQ 585 at p.604 makes the comment that the "coastal State is left with a free hand in the matter".
26 However, O'Connell supra at p.567 considers that "because traditional fishing interests have in the 
past been given priority over other interests, it is to be expected that they will continue to be asserted 
against coastal States and thus against competitors for surplus." See also Article 62(4) in terms of 
which access may depend on the "payment of fees and other forms of renumeration." The danger is 
that the fees could be fixed at unreasonably high rates which effectively prevent or discourage States 
from entering into access agreements.
27 However, Attard supra at p.164 argues that, "if it is accepted that under customary law there is an 
obligation to promote the optimum-utilisation objective in the EEZ, then it should follow that there is 
a complementary duty to give access to the surplus, thereby ensuring that there is no wastage". It 
should be noted that this reasoning is rendered fragile by virtue of Article 297(3)(b) in terms of whereof 
a coastal State is not obliged to submit to a settlement in the event of a dispute concerning its rights 
to living resources in the EEZ "including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable 
catch". Even if it were to accept a settlement, in terms of the same Article, the conciliation commission 
cannot substitute its own discretion for that of the coastal State.
28 O'Connell supra at p.563.
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It can therefore be readily appreciated why another commentator29 said that the effect of 
Article 64(1) is at least that the high seas fishing States are not free to unilaterally adopt 
measures applicable to the high seas fishery without first seeking co-operation with coastal 
States in the region, since such unilateral measures could prejudice the ultimate conservation 
and utilisation of "highly migratory species" within and outside the EEZ. The rationale of 
this observation is commendable, but should the coastal State not co-operate, the provision 
is no more than a brutum fultnen.30
FREEDOM OF FISHING AND LANDLOCKED AND OTHER GEOGRAPHICALLY 
DISADVANTAGED STATES
It is compelling to look at the position of the landlocked and other "geographically 
disadvantaged States" vis-a-vis the freedom of fishing.31 These States have a right via Articles 
69(1) and 70 (1), respectively, "to participate on an equitable basis in the exploitation of an 
appropriate part of the surplus of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the 
same subregion or region taking into account the relevant economic and geographical 
circumstances of all the States concerned."
The right is not an unconditional one, but relates only to "an appropriate part of the surplus" 
and is subject to "the relevant economic and geographic circumstances of all the States 
concerned". The observations earlier made in relation to land-locked States' difficulties in 
relation to access to their navigation rights apply mutatis mutandi here, more so, considering 
that in terms of Article 69(2)(c) the extent to which a coastal State may be burdened by 
such a request for access is a relevant consideration.
An additional difficulty presented to this category of States is, as pointed out elsewhere, 
that the term "equitable basis" does not confer priority on these States above all other 
States save coastal States,32 since Article 62(2) gives the coastal State the right to determine 
the amount of catch which corresponds to its harvesting capacity. It may be concluded that 
the coastal State enjoys preferential treatment in respect of the resources in the EEZ.
To compound all this, the formulation "whose geographical situation makes them 
dependent. . . for the nutritional purposes of their populations" is ambivalent, because 
one wonders whether the food value element, notably protein, is a matter which could tilt 
the balance in favour of these States. If such is the case, this would probably be countered 
by an argument that there are other food products in these countries which can sufficiently
29 See B. Kwiatkowska: 'The High Seas Fisheries Regime: at a Point of No Return" (1993) International 
Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law Vol.8 No.3 at p.330.
30 Ibid at p. 331. State practice discouragingly shows that some States like the U.S.A, Japan and the 
former Soviet Union have legislated for their sovereign rights over the whole migratory species in 
the EEZ. Attard supra at p.53 also notes that legislation in some countries demonstrates an 
unwillingness to recognise the existence of other States' rights in their EEZ'se.g. Sri Lanka's Maritime 
Zone Law (1976), Malaysia's EEZ Proclamation (1978) and the same applies to Bangladesh, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Kampuchea, Haiti and Togo.
31 Uys Van Zyl op cit at p.U6 observes that the sea’s resources now remains a compelling answer for 
landlocked states to develop their economies and improve the quality of life of their peoples. Art.70(2) 
provides that the term "geographically disadvantaged" Includes coastal States and States bordering 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon exploiting 
the living resources of the EEZ's of other States for the nutrition of their population, and coastal 
States with no EEZ of their own.
32 See Phillips op cit at p.609. The author also observes that access for landlocked countries is dependent 
on agreements "voluntarily entered into with the coastal State". See also, note 34 infra.
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make up for any nutrient value that may be derived from fish. Moreover, it has been argued 
elsewhere that the Article "ignores the position of the developing coastal country. . .  which 
derives no substantial benefit from its economic zone because of the scarcity of fishing and 
mineral resources within that zone".33 Presumably, a case could be made out that the term 
"geographical situation" embraces States which, as a matter of geographic reality are fated 
by history to occupy places lacking in fish or mineral resources.
It is tempting to associate with the view that it is in the interests of landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged States to keep the coastal State's jurisdiction within 
reasonable limits and to endeavour to secure for themselves a fair share of the resources of 
the EEZ 34
MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
In terms of Article 246(2) and (3) other States may, with the consent of the coastal State 
concerned, carry out marine scientific research in its EEZ, and the coastal States will "in 
normal circumstances grant their consent" (emphasis added).
But they may withhold consent to resource-orientated research,35 and it should be borne in 
mind that any research activities in the EEZ "shall not unjustifiably interfere with the 
activities undertaken by the coastal State in the exercise of their sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction provided for in the Convention".36 It, therefore, becomes understandable why 
reservations have been expressed that under this regime, bona fide marine research may 
come across bureaucratic hindrances not connected with the merits of the project, which 
may lead to the programme being abandoned or changed "to accommodate coastal 
demands".37
It would appear that, consent would have to be obtained for research directed at the testing 
of military equipment or which involves military surveillance, although a contrary view 
has been expressed.38 Article 240 which imposes a general duty upon States to, inter alia, 
"conduct marine scientific research which ensures the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment",39 seems to imply that military-orientated marine research which 
may involve use of explosives or discharge of radioactive substances is objectionable on 
the basis that it constitutes a danger to the marine environment.
33 Ibid at p. 610. As the author points out, no right exists to exploit mineral resources in the economic 
zones of other coastal States, and therefore an argument based on scarcity or otherwise of resources is 
self-defeating.
34 Calflish supra at p.71
See also, Attard op cil at p.207 where he says that the legal rights of disadvantaged States will have to 
be realised through "the normal process of negotiated agreements according to which political support 
or some other commodity will be exchanged" as a quid pro quo for right to exploit a neighbouring 
State's EEZ.
35 Art.246(5) lists various forms of research related to the economic exploitation of the zone.
36 Art.246(8).
37 Attard op cil at p.122. See also, Art.297(2)fb) which does not oblige a coastal State to submit to dispute 
settlement and paragraph (2)(b) of this Article which provides that even if it agrees to a settlement, 
the exercise of its discretion shall not be questioned.
38 Phillips op cit at p. 598. Military surveillance may therefore be inconsistent with use for peaceful 
purposes. See also, note 7 and 18 op cit.
39 See also, Art.193 which gives States the sovereign right to exploit the natural resources "pursuant to 
their environmental policies and in accordance with theirduty to preserve the marine environment." 
Hence, other States could possibly have no greater rights.
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Finally, it will be observed that, despite provision for  the rights enumerated above to other 
States, their practical realization may be of limited significance or virtually non-existent, 
when regard is paid to the leeway available to a coastal State. In that scheme of things, the 
discretion might be improperly used to thwart the interests of other States, especially land­
locked States. These States can only place their hope in Article 300 which enjoins all States 
to act in good faith and "in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right." As 
noted hereinbefore, State practice does not encourage a development of confidence in this 
provision.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the democratisation process that has taken place in South Africa must be 
viewed as significant for the sub-region. There is no doubt at all that South Africa commands 
enormous economic and technological resources and potential. As such its role in the 
maritime politics of the sub-region is predictable.
The need is now inevitable for Zimbabwe and other sub-regional countries to co-operate 
fully with South Africa in trade matters, so that their dream of enjoying the freedom of the 
seas and EEZ, through South Africa, may be accomplished to the betterment of their 
economic development.
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